Lee, 1982 ; Gillette v. Commissioner, 1989 rejecting free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes alleged to make religious activities more difficult. In cases involving unemployment compensation or other contexts where these types of exemptions are available, such as zoning, the government must have a compelling reason when it rejects religious hardship as such a cause. Rhode Island, , 69 1953 ; cf. It would then be placed in a dilemma, it says, between allowing a patchwork of exemptions that would hinder its law enforcement efforts, and risking a violation of the Establishment Clause by arbitrarily limiting its religious exemptions. On remand, the State Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from, the state law prohibition, but concluded that that prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause. Legal Venue of Employment division v.
Question the Supreme Court answered Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes? McCormick, 1944 same , or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. I would reach the same result applying our established free exercise jurisprudence. Because we are uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon, it is not now appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution. The confrontation inflamed the scars of the past. Over the years, various sects have raised free exercise claims regarding drug use. There is no exemption for individuals who hold a certain religious belief if a generally applicable rule happens to place a burden on exercising that belief.
. There was a story yesterday about an effort to put a proposition on the San Francisco ballot that would ban male circumcision of children. Employment Division of Oregon v. But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. Julien, A Primer of Drug Action 148 3d ed.
Julien, A Primer of Drug Action 148 3d ed. For these reasons, I believe that granting a selective exemption in this case would seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote by its citizens. For these reasons, I believe that granting a selective exemption in this case would seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote by its citizens. The rituals are an integral part of the life process. The peyote plant is extremely bitter, and eating it is an unpleasant experience, which would tend to discourage casual or recreational use. United States, 1879 , where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice. Case Commentary State action is usually valid if it regulates conduct generally, while happening to include religious conduct.
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right. Indeed, it is surely unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us. In reaching that conclusion, the court attached no significance to the fact that peyote possession is a felony in Oregon, declaring that the legality of ingesting peyote did not affect its analysis of the State's interest in denying benefits, which must be found in the unemployment compensation, rather than the criminal, statutes. We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Supreme Court lists some cases that they have ruled the same in because the court is going by precedent.
United States, , 461 1971 , we sustained the military selective service system against the claim that it violated free exercise by conscripting persons who opposed a particular war on religious grounds. We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind -- ranging from compulsory military service to the payment of taxes to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws; to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races. If the Oregon Supreme Court's holding rests on the unstated premise that respondents' conduct is entitled to the same measure of federal constitutional protection regardless of its criminality, that holding is erroneous. The Native American Church's internal restrictions on, and supervision of, its members' use of peyote substantially obviate the State's health and safety concerns.
Moreover, just as in Yoder, the values and interests of those seeking a religious exemption in this case are congruent, to a great degree, with those the State seeks to promote through its drug laws. Nor would application of our established free exercise doctrine to this case necessarily be incompatible with our equal protection cases. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities. Before this Court in 1987, petitioner continued to maintain that the illegality of respondents' peyote consumption was relevant to their constitutional claim. Failure to reduce the competing interests to the same plane of generality tends to distort the weighing process in the State's favor.
Since the State could not constitutionally enforce its criminal prohibition against respondents, the interests underlying the State's drug laws cannot justify its denial of unemployment benefits. Brown, 1961 plurality opinion , we upheld Sunday closing laws against the claim that they burdened the religious practices of persons whose religions compelled them to refrain from work on other days. Earlier decisions on the withholding of unemployment benefits had used a strict scrutiny standard of review, which requires identifying a compelling government interest. This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
The Court today gives no convincing reason to depart from settled First Amendment jurisprudence. But there was no evidence that religious use of peyote actually harmed anyone. Verner, 1963 , and Thomas v. United States, supra, 401 U. Barnette, 1943 invalidating compulsory flag salute statute challenged by religious objectors. The First Amendment, however, does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices.
In this case, the State's justification for refusing to recognize an exception to its criminal laws for religious peyote use is entirely speculative. Our conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible with these precedents. Robert Bergman, testified by affidavit to this effect on behalf of respondent Smith before the Employment Appeal Board. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,' contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. Without peyote, they could not enact the essential ritual of their religion. The plaintiffs in that case asserted that it would violate their religious beliefs to obtain and provide a Social Security number for their daughter.